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ABSTRACT. In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal 
very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the 
symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the coveting law model, turns out to 
be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, 
which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always 
hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is needed. And we 
will investigate owhat extent non-monotonic epistemic logic can provide such an alterna- 
tive logical framework. Finally we will show that our non-monotonic logical analysis of 
explanation is not only suitable for simple cases such as the electric circuit, but that it 
also sheds new light on more controversial causal explanations such as Milton Friedman's 
explanation of the business cycle. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are different modes of explanation of which Hempel's covering 
law model has received most attention. For a long period of time 
philosophers of science thought hat the covering law model is essen- 
tially correct. This attitude might be partly explained by the fact that 
its formalization has proved to be possible in a logical satisfactory 
way. In recent years Hempel's model of explanation has been severely 
criticized, and interest seems to shift away from logical analyses of 
explanation (see Salmon 1989). In this paper we extend the list of 
criticisms by claiming that the covering law model is not very well 
suited to deal with situations in which there is incomplete knowledge 
(information). The covering law model can only be applied to cases 
where everything is known: the relevant empirical law, initial con- 
ditions, absence of potential distorting factors, etc. We claim that in 
science these conditions are seldom met. This paper focuses attention 
upon situations in which the relevant covering law is not known. We 
will show that in cases of incomplete knowledge intuitive appealing 
explanations are still feasible. In addition we offer a formalization of 
this type of explanation in so called non-monotonic logic, which is 
supplementary to the deductive scheme of Hempel's covering law 
model. Non-monotonic logic has been recently developed in artificial 
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intelligence research to formalize reasoning with incomplete infor- 
mation. We will show that in particular the non-monotonic epistemic 
logic (NMEL) that was introduced by Y. Shoham is very suitable to 
formalize explanations based on incomplete knowledge. So, although 
we agree with much of the criticism on Hempel's model, we still think 
a logical analysis of explanation is feasible. 
A second purpose of the paper is to give an alternative account of 
the method Milton Friedman actually uses in his studies on monetary 
history. We will see that Friedman's work is permeated with passages 
which indicate that he is fully aware of the fact that in economics a lot 
is unknown. We will show that Friedman's explanations can be seen 
as paradigmatic examples of incomplete knowledge xplanations. His 
explanatory arguments are formally reconstructed in NMEL. By offer- 
ing such a formal reconstruction we do not claim to give a justification 
of Friedman's method. Our main objective is to show how he makes 
his case. (Of course, we would not have undertaken the effort to 
reconstruct his arguments, if we were of the opinion that there are no 
useful elements in it). 
At this point an aside is in order. The methodology of economics 
has seen a vast literature on the exegesis of Friedman's (1953) essay in 
which he proposes an instrumentalist 'as-if' methodology. The main 
thesis of this essay is that a theory should be tested by its predictions 
and not by the realism of its assumptions. We do not contribute to the 
exegesis of the essay. On the contrary, one of our purposes is to show 
that the 'as-if' methodology debate, or the F-twist, has directed the 
attention to issues that have hardly contributed to an understanding of 
the method Friedman actually applies in his economic work. t Tradition- 
ally, Friedman's research as an economist has been interpreted as an 
implementation f his own 'as-if' methodology (see, e.g., Blaug 1976). 
We claim that Friedman's main contributions to economics can be 
better understood as a case of incomplete knowledge xplanations. This 
does not mean that we deny that aspects of the 'as-if' methodology can 
be pointed out in Friedman's research, but instead we simply believe 
that those aspects are not as important as other authors eem to suggest. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an example 
of an electric circuit in which a large part of the circuit is hidden 
(unknown) to the observer. The example serves a dual purpose. It 
elucidates the concept of incomplete knowledge, and at the same time, 
some more substantial points about explanation and prediction based 
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on incomplete knowledge can be learned from it. Among other things it 
is shown that there is an asymmetry between explanation and prediction 
which cannot be accounted for in the covering law model. In Section 
3 we demonstrate hat there are many striking similarities between the 
electric circuit example and Friedman's work. For this purpose we 
analyze Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History (1963, and Fried- 
man 1969). In order to taste something of the flavor with which Fried- 
man presents his arguments we give several quotations from his original 
work. Section 4 presents Shoham's non-monotonic logic NMEL and its 
application to the electric circuit example. It turns out that within 
NMEL a natural account of the asymmetry between explanation and 
prediction can be given. In Section 5 we apply NMEL to Friedman's 
studies on monetary history, and it is shown that our NMEL analysis 
contributes to a better understanding of Friedman's arguments. Finally, 
in Section 6 the results of this paper will be summed up, and we give 
some suggestions for further research. 
2. EXPLANATIONS WITHOUT COVERING LAWS 
In Tan (1988) an example of an explanation with incomplete infor- 
mation is discussed which is not covered by Hempel's Covering Law 
Model of causal explanations. 2 In this section we will study this 'coun- 
ter'-example more closely. According to Hempel an explanation is a 
deductive inference which can be roughly presented as follows: 
(I) (1) P(a) 
(2) Vx(P(x) -~ O(x)) 
Q(a) 
Q(a) is an observed event, which is caused by the occurrence of P(a). 
The second premise Vx(P(x) --~ Q(x)) is a covering law, which consti- 
tutes the core of the deductive xplanation. Covering laws are usually 
derived from a more general theory. An important aspect of Hempel's 
deductive account of explanations i  the symmetry between explanation 
and prediction. The symmetry thesis ays that if we can deductively 
explain with hindsight (ex post) the occurrence of Q(a) from premises 
1 and 2, then we could as well have predicted in advance (ex ante) that 
Q(a) will occur if P(a) occurs. This symmetry can be illustrated with 
the following example: 
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Fig. 1. 
This figure represents an electric circuit at two consecutive stages, tt 
and t2. At timepoint tt the switch St is off and the lamp L is off too. 
At the next moment t2 the switch St is turned on, with the consequence 
that the lamp goes on. This causal relation can be expressed by the 
following law: 
(W) Vt[((t, St = on) ^  (t,S2 = on)) ~ (t,L = on)]. 
Substituting this law for the second premise in Hempel's cheme, it is 
clear that the burning of the lamp is deductively explainable. Moreover 
it is also obvious that the symmetry thesis holds in this case. When we 
know in advance that at t2 switch S~ will be turned on and that $2 will 
still be on, we could use W to predict hat at t2 the lamp will be on. 
Though obvious this symmetry thesis seems to be, there are cases in 
which the symmetry breaks down. Consider the next counter example: 
tl t2 
Fig. 2 
The situation in Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except hat now the 
circuit is contained in a black box and only St and the lamp are observ- 
able from the outside. Suppose person P doesn't know what is in the 
box. At t2 he turns $1 on, and observes that the lamp goes on. When 
asked for an explanation, obody will be surprised if P answers that 
the pressing of $1 caused the burning of the lamp. This seems to be a 
perfectly normal causal explanation, but from a Hempelian point of 
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view something strange is going on here. First of all there is no symme- 
try. P can explain with hindsight why the lamp went on at t2, but he 
could not have predicted this event, as he does not know what is in the 
box. The box might have been empty, i.e., no battery and no wires at 
all. To know the law W, one has to know the interior of the box. And 
without knowing W, one cannot predict the burning of the lamp. 
Though P's ignorance accounts for the fact that he could not predict 
this event, it leaves P's explanation a mystery. According to Hempel's 
scheme, knowledge of covering laws is essential for explanations. How- 
ever, the example above clearly shows not only that the symmetry 
thesis does not always hold, but also that causal explanations are not 
necessarily based on covering laws. 
This phenomenon of asymmetry has been noticed before by other 
authors. A nice example of this asymmetry is discussed in Cartwright 
(1983, p. 51, 52). She knew that on the one hand camellias flourish 
when planted in rich soil, while on the other hand camellias die when 
planted in warm soil. Hence, when she actually planted her camellias 
in soil that was both rich and warm, she couldn't predict beforehand 
whether her camellias would flourish or die. After a while she observed 
that most of the camellias died. It was only after she made this obser- 
vation that she was able to conclude that the camellias died, because 
they where planted in warm soil. She comments that this explanation 
is not an explanation from any true covering law. There is no law that 
says that camellias just like hers, planted in soil which is both hot and 
rich, die. Hence, she claims that" . . ,  our ability to give this explanation 
precedes our knowledge of that law". Although the role of incomplete 
knowledge in Cartwright's example is not so manifest as in our example, 
her example does illustrate very clearly that an ex post explanation 
does not always coincide with an ex ante prediction. Finally, an example 
which illustrates not only the asymmetry but also the role of incomplete 
knowledge is the crash of the stock market of October 1987. Hardly 
anybody had predicted that this crash would occur at the nineteenth of 
October. But once the crash had happened, economists were eager to 
explain that it was bound to happen. 
Our observation that we can have explanations without covering laws 
should not be misunderstood. We do not claim that knowledge about 
electricity is irrelevant for P's explanation. Some general background 
knowledge does play a role in P's explanation, and a very important 
role indeed! If P would have answered that simply touching the switch 
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caused the lamp to burn, his explanation wouldn't be taken seriously, 
because it indicates that he doesn't know anything about electricity. Or 
if P were very imaginative he might even have reversed the causal 
direction; e.g., he might have answered that some Powerful God, by 
turning on the light, forced him to press the switch. Obviously these 
explanations are not acceptable, because they are not in accordance 
with our general knowledge about electricity. However, this kind of 
knowledge plays a totally different role than the empirical aw W in 
Figure 1. This general background knowledge is used to narrow down 
the set of causal aws that could account for the burning of the light; 
i.e., it acts like a set of boundary conditions for the adequacy of 
explanations. Before P observed that pressing $1 was followed by the 
burning of the lamp, it was still possible that there were no wires in the 
box and henceforth that there was no causal link whatsoever between $1 
and the lamp. And it was only after this observation that he could 
exclude this possibility. As the two events of turning on the switch and 
the lamp occurred at virtually the very same moment, P could in 
principle still have been in doubt about the direction of causality. But 
the possibility that pressing the switch was caused by the burning of 
the lamp was immediately ruled out by his background knowledge. 
Thus P arrived at the 'only' sensible conclusion that was left; i.e., 
turning on the switch caused the lamp to burn. This suggests the follow- 
ing type of argument: 
(II) (1) P(a) 
(2) Q(a) 
Vx(P(x) ~ Q(x)) 
Prima facie this scheme looks rather curious. It is a non sequitur in 
classical logic, as is indicated by the dotted line. However, this problem 
will be dealt with in Section 4. There we will see that the non-monotonic 
logic NMEL validates inferences like the scheme above. Applying 
scheme II to P's explanation of the fact that the lamp went on, it is 
obvious that P is not in the position to conclude W. Because W contains 
the necessary condition that switch $2 has to be on, and P is not even 
aware of the existence of this second switch. However, P could come 
up with a close approximation of W, i.e., something like 
(W') Vt[((t, S~ = on) ^  (t,~D)) ~ (t, L = on)]. 
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The expression -nD, which stands for 'there a,'e no distorting factors 
in the system under consideration', is a kind of unspecified ceteris 
paribus clause. P assumes that there is some sort of electric circuit 
hidden in the black box which is not influenced by distorting factors in 
the sense that the current is somewhere interrupted in the circuit, or 
that the power supply is not functioning properly. 3 When this ceteris 
paribus clause holds, then pressing S~ causes the lamp to burn. Thus 
we arrive at the following instantiation of scheme II" 
(II') (1) (2, S~ = on) 
(2) (2, L = on) 
Vt[(t, S 1 = on) ^  (t, ~D) ~ (t, L = on)] 
From the observation that at moment 2 the lamp went on when he 
turned on the switch, P concluded that pressing the switch caused the 
burning of the lamp. 
The moral of our analysis of the electric circuit example can be 
summed up as follows. The real problem of a Hempelian style deductive 
explanation is not performing the deduction itself; i.e., explanation is 
not just a logical exercise, but the real problem is to find the specific 
law that does the job. The basic problem is how to apply a general 
theory to a specific situation. Hempel also paid attention to this prob- 
lem. According to Hempel the finding of a specific law that applies to 
a specific situation is also a deductive argument. Let T be the general 
theory about electricity; i.e., the set of all basic laws of electricity and 
let F be the factual description of the electric circuit; i.e., F mentions 
that the circuit consists of four components which are connected in a 
certain way by wires, etc. One has found the specific law W, if one can 
derive W from T and F, i.e., T U F F W. However, this simple deduc- 
tive account of finding a law does not work for the explanation of P. 
As P has only incomplete information about the electric circuit, he is 
unable to derive the specific law W, even if he would know T by heart. 
Scheme II' provides the best guess that P can come up with. Hence, 
scheme II is supplementary to Hempel's deductive account of explana- 
tion in the sense that it applies to cases with incomplete information 
which are not very well dealt with by Hempel's cheme. 
We do not consider scheme II as some sort of substitute for an 
inductive logic to discover new empirical aws. We pointed out that 
scheme II only makes ense against he background of a well-established 
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general background theory T. Without the boundary conditions pro- 
vided by T, arguments like II could produce unintended conclusions 
such as the 'Powerful God' explanation. We have assumed the existence 
of such a background theory. The question how to discover such general 
theories is beyond the scope of this article. Scheme II is not meant as 
a scheme for abductive reasoning either. In abductive reasoning it is 
argued that one 'infers' from the two premises Vx(P(x)~ Q(x)) and 
Q(a), that P(a) is the most probable candidate to have caused Q(a). 
However, in scheme II it is the causal aw that is inferred and not the 
fact P(a). 
In the next section we will discuss one of Friedman's most famous 
studies in economics. We will see that Friedman's line of reasoning in 
his studies on monetary history is a clear example of an explanatory 
argument which is in accordance with scheme II. 
3. FR IEDMAN ON MONETARY H ISTORY 
The example discussed in the previous section is something of a toy 
problem. In this section we show that a piece of actual scientific research 
exhibits the most substantial points made in the previous ection. We 
will discuss Friedman and Schwartz's interpretation of the economic 
history of the U.S. from 1867 to 1960 as it is presented in Friedman 
(1969, chapter 10), 
Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History is devoted to an explana- 
tion of the fluctuations in some major economic quantities uch as 
money and income. 4The chapter we discuss consists of three parts each 
of which presents a separate part of Friedman's explanation. (For a 
more detailed philosophical study of the literature concerning the Mon- 
etary History see Hirsch and de Marchi (1986)). In the first part Fried- 
man presents ome data about the cyclical behavior of the money stock 
(see Figure 3). At first sight there seems to be no relation between 
money and income (the latter as an indicator of economic activity, i.e., 
the business cycle). However, after presenting the data in terms of the 
rate of change Friedman observes a striking similarity in the rate of 
change of income and the stock of money. From this observation Fried- 
man draws the conclusion that there "unquestionably is a close relation 
between the variability of the stock of money and the variability of 
income" (p. 205-6). However this 'close relation' is not a perfect 
correlation. According to Friedman the deviations in the relation be- 
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tween the rate of change of money and income can be explained away 
by pointing out distorting factors such as the "changing statistical 
character of the net national product estimates" (p. 203) and the "sta- 
tistical errors in our money series" (p. 199). Furthermore, "standard 
deviations based on only four observations (three degrees of freedom) 
are subject to a good deal of sampling variation" (p. 203) and also, 
nominal income is "an inadequate index of economic hange" (p. 199). 
As all the available evidence can be interpreted in such a way that 
deviations from the perfect correlation are accounted for by the pres- 
ence of distorting factors, Friedman concludes that this correlation 
holds. 
In the second part Friedman investigates what the direction of cau- 
sality (Friedman uses the term influence) is: Are monetary changes 
caused by changes in economic activity, or are changes in economic 
activity caused by monetary changes? Friedman attacks this question 
by studying the historical circumstances underlying the changes in the 
stock of money. He shows that major changes in the stock of money 
can be attributed to specific autonomous historical circumstances. (Ac- 
cording to Friedman, these circumstances are autonomous in the sense 
that they are not themselves causally influenced by the business cycle.) 
For this purpose Friedman uses the known fact that "changes in the 
stock of money can, arithmetically, be attributed to changes in three 
proximate determinants" (p. 209). (Here, arithmetically means "more 
or less by definition".) He subsequently shows that each of the major 
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changes in the money stock is attributable to a change in one specific 
determinant, implicitly assuming that the other two determinants have 
not changed. He also shows that turning points in the rate of change 
of the money stock show a lead over turning points in the rate of change 
in income. From these two sources of evidence Friedman concludes that 
it is likely that the direction of causality runs from money to income. 
Thus, he arrives at a monetary account of the business cycle; i.e., an 
increase (decrease) in income is caused by an increase (decrease) in the 
stock of money. However, the evidence for a monetary account of the 
business cycle is not so strong for minor changes in the stock of money 
as it is for major changes. But this does not restrain Friedman from 
proposing his monetary explanation: "clearly, the view that monetary 
change is important does not preclude the existence of other factors 
that affect the course of business" (p. 222) and somewhat rhetorically 
he adds "[i]s not a common explanation for both (major and minor 
fluctuations) more appealing than separate xplanations?" (p. 223). 
Thus, for minor changes Friedman does not commit himself to his 
monetary explanation. He makes as many reservations a possible with- 
out questioning the direction of causality, or in our terminology, he 
introduces an unspecified ceteris paribus clause. 
In the account of the electric circuit we have given in the previous 
section a similar passage as the second part of Friedman's explanation 
seems to be largely absent at first sight. This is due to the fact that the 
'Powerful God' explanation of the previous ection is immediately ruled 
out, because it is not in accordance with the common sense belief that 
pressing the switch is an autonomous act with respect o the electric 
circuit. In Friedman's case the direction of causality between money 
and income is not so obvious and, therefore, it deserves a separate 
analysis. He shows that changes in the rate of growth of the money 
stock can be attributed to factors that may be regarded as autonomous 
with respect o the relation between money and income. 
In the previous section we have remarked that P's explanation is
convincing, because it is embedded in a system of background knowl- 
edge. The common sense component of this background knowledge 
consists of the following two elements: (i) we all know that switches 
and lamps stand in some relation to each other and (ii) our conjectures 
about he relation between switches and lamps have shown to be rather 
reliable in a lot of different situations. Precisely these two elements are 
also mentioned by Friedman: (i) "we know that money is a pervasive 
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element in the economy" (p. 214) and (ii) "the relation between money 
and business has remained largely unchanged over a period that has 
seen such substantial changes in the arrangements determining the 
quantity of money" (p. 215). 
In the third part Friedman discusses the theoretical transmission 
mechanism that relates monetary and economic hanges. A mechanism 
that is consistent with fundamental economic theory is needed, because 
"however consistent may be the relation between monetary and eco- 
nomic change, and however strong the evidence for the autonomy of 
monetary changes, we shall not be persuaded, unless we can specify in 
some detail the mechanism that connects the one with the other" (p. 
229). That is, the proposed relation should also be in consonance with 
the economic theory contained in the background knowledge. For our 
purpose it is not needed to enter into the details of the proposed 
mechanism. It is sufficient o say that if the theoretical mechanism is 
the "true" mechanism relating monetary and economic hanges then 
the covariance is no longer a surprising fact. The mechanism Friedman 
proposes is only tentative and of a ceteris paribus character : "let us 
neglect for the time being the effect of returns on other assets as well 
as still other possible variables" (p. 224). 
The last part of Friedman's argument in the Monetary History is 
strongly related to the fact that P's explanation is consistent with (can 
be derived from) universal electricity laws. 5 Of course as both systems 
are incompletely known one can only expect to derive conjectural 
knowledge, i.e., the proposed theoretical transmission mechanism ay 
not be the actual one. 
In the previous ection we mentioned that P concludes the law W' 
from the observations that the lamp went on when the switch $1 was 
turned on. In the same spirit Friedman infers from his observations 
concerning the cyclical pattern of the economy that the cyclical behavior 
of the money stock causes the cyclical behavior in major economic 
variables, notably income. This causal aw relating money and income 
is the conclusion rather than a premise of Friedman's argument. A 
second point is that Friedman does not attempt o predict the future 
course of the business cycle on the basis of the covariance between the 
rate of change of the money stock and the rate of change of income. 
Friedman tries to interpret he evidence on money and income: he is 
engaged in explaining ex post a part of the economic history of the 
U.S. (i.e., 'rationalizing known evidence' - see Hirsch and de Marchi 
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(1986, p. 2) and Hammond (1988) and not in ex ante prediction. It is 
very questionable whether Friedman could have predicted this causal 
relation between money and income before he had the data at his 
disposal. Remember that in the first part of his study Friedman had to 
explain away many deviations in order to convince his readers that 
there was a correlation between the rate of change of the money stock 
and the rate of change of income. Apparently even this correlation was 
something of a surprise. This too is similar to the electric ircuit example 
where person P cannot predict what will happen when he turns the 
switch $1 on, but he is indeed able to explain ex post why the lamp 
went on when he turned on the switch. 
4.  NON-MONOTONIC  EP ISTEMIC  LOGIC  (NMEL)  
Non-monotonic epistemic logic (NMEL) was introduced in Shoham 
(1988a, 1988b). It was developed to formalize reasoning with incom- 
plete information. 6 Before we can show how P's explanation of the 
electric ircuit can be analyzed in NMEL, we first have to explain some 
technical details of NMEL. In this section we will only give a brief 
introduction of NMEL; for precise definitions and some relevant theor- 
ems the reader is referred to the appendix. In NMEL we can distinguish 
two aspects: an epistemic aspect and a non-monotonic aspect. 
Epistemic aspect of NMEL 
NMEL is a first-order predicate logic that contains two epistemic oper- 
ators: 
Otp: P knows that ~ is the case. 
q~: P can assume that ,p is the case, unless he knows that 
,p is not the case. 
For example the formula 0(2, St = on) expresses that person P knows 
that the switch $1 is on at timepoint t2. The ~-operator is definable in 
terms of the Fq-operator: 7 
~ = df "-I E]'-'I,~. 
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Non-monotonic aspect of NMEL 
From a semantic point of view the crucial difference between NMEL 
and a classical (monotonic) logic is the minimality condition on models. 
In a monotonic logic an argument is valid if the conclusion is true in 
all models in which the premises are true: 
A ~ B, i.e., A entails B, if B is t.rue in all models of A. 
In NMEL, however, only those models are taken into account that are 
minimal in some sense: 
A Pc B, if B is true in all minimal models of A. 
(More formally: A Pc B=df for all models M: if M Pc A, then M Pc B.) 
Here, M Pc A means that M is a minimal model of A. Different 
definitions of the notion of minimality ield different non-monotonic 
logics. In NMEL the notion of minimality is defined as follows. M is a 
minimal knowledge model of the set of premises A, written M Pc A, if 
(1) M satisfies A, i.e., M ~ A. 
(2) for every alternative model M' that satisfies less formulas of 
the form [3~0 than M; it holds that M' does not satisfy A. 
Condition 2 implies that a minimal model M of A satisfies as few 
formulas of the form Dq~ as possible. Consider the example that A = 
{FI(1, p), [](1, q)}. The only formulas of the form D~ that are satisfied 
by a minimal model M of A are l-q(1,p), I--](1, q) and the classical $5 
deductive consequences of these formulas such as for example the 
conjunction ff](1, p) ^  [3(1, q).8 An example of a non-minimal model 
M' of A is a model that satisfies not only Iq(1,p) and D(1, q), but also 
D(1, r), Where [](1, r) is not a classical $5 deductive consequence of
DO,p) and [](1, q). M' is not minimal, because ff](1, r) is true in M', 
and there is an alternative model, namely M, that satisfies less formulas 
than M' and satisfies A as well. 
The semantics of NMEL is a special case of a Kripke style possible 
world semantics for modal ogic. 9 A NMEL-model is a set of "parallel" 
time lines, all sharing the same structure of time. Each world describes 
a possible course of the universe over the same period of time. Hence, 
over the same period of time, but in different worlds, different facts 
are true. An example of such a NMEL-model is the following structure: 
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tl t2 I3 t4 ts 
W1 
W2 
W3 
W n 
Here, wi is a possible world, and ti a timepoint. A NMEL-model has 
a S5-accessibility relation between the worlds, hence explicit mention 
of the accessibility relation is not necessary. The operators [] and <> 
are defined in NMEL as follows: 
M P ~0¢~ for all w in M: M, wP~ 
M P <>~¢~ for at least one w in M: M, w P 
Here M, w ~ ~ means that ~ is true in world w in model M. To illustrate 
the difference between NMEL and a monotonic epistemic logic, con- 
sider the following example: 
(III) (1) B 
(2) BA~C-~D 
D 
This argument is not valid in a monotonic logic, because the premise 
OC is lacking. In NMEL however this argument is valid. In other words 
one can prove that the following holds: 
B, (B ^ OC)--* D PoD. 
This can be argued for as follows. B, (B A OC) --~ D Pc D is valid, if 
D is true in all minimal models of the set of premises 
(B, (B ^ OC) ~ D). It is simple to prove that this is the case. We wilt 
give a sketch of the argument. Consider a minimal model M of this set 
of premises, i.e., M Pc B A (B A <>C)--~ D. This implies that 
(1) M ~ B and M ~ (B ^ <>C)---~ D. 
As [] 7 C is not a classical $5 deductive consequence of this set of 
premises, this formula will not be satisfied by the minimal model M, i.e., 
M g [] -7 C.1° Consequently, we have M P -7 [] -7 C. So, by definition, it 
follows that 
(2) M ~ OC. 
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From 1 and 2 it follows that M ~ D, which finishes the sketch of the 
argument. 
Note that if a model is minimized with respect o the number of [2- 
formulas, then it is in a sense maximized with respect o the number 
of <>-formulas. Because if M does not satisfy [] --1 ~, then it does satisfy 
7 [] -7 ~, and hence by definition it does satisfy <>~0. This corresponds 
to the intuitive reading of the <>-operator, which says that one can 
assume q~, unless one already knows that 7 t¢ is the case. 
After this short introduction to NMEL, we can explain how NMEL 
can be used to formalize P's explanation of the burning of the lamp in 
the electric circuit. The problem is that although P is unable to predict 
the burning of the lamp, he can very well explain afterward why the 
lamp went on at t2. This asymmetry of prediction and explanation is 
due to the fact that P, not having complete knowledge, is unable to 
use the empirical aw W. However in his explanation P is supposed to 
arrive at an empirical aw W'; which is a close approximation of W. 
First, we will present he NMEL analysis of P's explanation. After that 
we will show how NMEL accounts for the fact that P is unable to 
predict he burning of the lamp. 
At timepoint t2 P is pressing switch SI, and subsequently he observes 
that the lamp L goes on. Hence, P knows that at t2 both S~ and L 
are on, which is expressed by D(2, $1 = on) and [](2, L = on). These 
observations led P to the conjecture that the burning of the light was 
caused by switching S~, This explanatory argument can be formalized 
in NMEL as follows: 
(IV) (1) E3(2, S~ = on) 
(2) D(2, L = on) 
<>Vt[((t, S1 = on) ^  <>(t, ~D)) --, (t, L = on)] (Cl) 
This argument is analogous to argument (II'). H It expresses that, given 
the knowledge P has about the circuit at t2, he can assume that the law 
Vt[((t, S1 = on) ^  <>(t, ~D)) ~ (t, L -- on)] holds. This law says that 
turning on the switch will cause the lamp to burn, provided one can 
assume that there are no distorting factors in the circuit. This argument 
is valid in NMEL, and not valid in a monotonic epistemic logic.t2 For 
proofs of this and subsequent arguments the reader is referred to the 
appendix. 
The NMEL analysis also accounts for the fact that P cannot ex ante 
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predict at t~ that the light will go on, when S~ is turned on at the next 
moment 2. At t~ P only knows that he will turn on the switch S~ at the 
next moment 2. As P is not even aware of the existence of the other 
switch $2, he certainly doesn't know that this switch is on at t2, and 
neither does he know the law W, i.e. Vt[((t, $1 = on)A (t, $2 = 
on)) --* (t, L = on)]. Thus, at tl P may argue as follows: 
(v) (1) n(2, sx = on) 
-7[3(2, L = on) 
Hence, although P intends to turn S~ on at t2, he does not know that 
the lamp will go on. This means that P cannot predict whether the light 
will be on at t2 or not. This argument is valid in NMEL, and not valid 
in a monotonic epistemic logic. 13 
However, if P had complete knowledge about the circuit, he could 
predict that the light will go on. This can be argued for as follows. At 
tl P intends to press $1 at t2, so he knows that this switch will be on at 
t2; i.e,, [~(2, $1 = on). Furthermore, having complete knowledge, P 
knows the law W, i.e., [~Vt[((t, Sl = on) ^  (t, $2 = on)) ~ (t, L = on)], 
and he knows that the other switch $2 will still be on at t2, i.e., V1(2, $2 = 
on). Thus, at tl P could argue as follows: 
(VI) (1) I-7(2, S1 = on) 
(2) 13(2, $2 = on) 
(3) FqVt[((t, Sl = on) ^  (t, $2 = on)) ~ (t, L = on)] 
V1(2, L = on) 
This predictive argument is valid in NMEL. It is also valid in a mono- 
tonic epistemic logic. Hence, the validity of this argument does not 
depend on the non-monotonicity property of NMEL. The reason that 
we mention this example is that it shows that Hempel's covering law 
model is simply a special (ideal!) case in NMEL. If P has complete 
knowledge, the NMEL analysis of predictions i analogous to Hempel's 
analysis. 
With respect o P's explanation, i.e., argument IV, we have to make 
one final comment. The following explanatory argument is also valid 
in NMEL: 
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~IV') (1) 0(2, S 1 = on) 
(2) [3(2, L = on) 
~Vt[((t, L = on)/x ©(t, (t, -TD)) 
(t, $1 = on))] (C2) 
The difference with (IV) is that in the conclusion of this argument the 
causal direction is reversed; C2 says that $1 being on is caused by the 
light going on. We don't think NMEL is to be blamed for this ambiguity 
of causal direction. 14 It is always hard to establish the causal direction 
between two (almost) simultaneous events. It only indicates that in 
explanatory arguments it is not only logic that matters. Pragmatic on- 
siderations also have to be taken into account. Actually, this problem 
was already discussed in Section 2. There it was observed that the 
'Powerful-God' explanation, which is analogous to C2, was excluded by 
general background knowledge about electricity. Although our NMEL 
analysis does not exclude the possibility that P could have argued as in 
(IV'), this argument is as it were overruled by general background 
knowledge. Technically, this result could easily be obtained by ex- 
tending the set of premises in (IV) with the set T, that includes all the 
knowledge sentences representing the general background knowledge. 
Presupposing that T does indeed exclude C2, i.e., T ~ 7C2, and that T 
does not exclude C1, i.e., T g -7C~, we would get the following argu- 
ment in NMEL: 
(VII) (1) if](2, S1 = on) 
(2) D(2, L = on) 
(3) T 
C1 A 7C2 
Hence, if we would really take all of P's general background knowledge 
into account, we arrive at exactly the intended explanatory argument. 
The problem with T is of course that usually this background knowledge 
is so extensive that we won't be able to write it down. Consequently, 
the role of background knowledge is inherently obscure in every logical 
analysis of explanatory arguments. It is for this reason that we consider 
background knowledge to be a pragmatic aspect of explanatory argu- 
ments. 
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5.  A LOGICAL  RECONSTRUCTION OF FR IEDMAN'S  MONETARY 
H ISTORY 
In this section we attempt to reconstruct Friedman's arguments in terms 
of NMEL. We focus attention upon the unspecified ceteris paribus 
clause Friedman uses. In the first part of 'Money and Business Cycles' 
Friedman describes ome facts about the rate of change of the money 
stock (M, =a,) and of nominal income (I?t = fit). It is remarked that 
turning points in the rate of change of the money stock show a lead 
over turning points in the rate of change of income and this relation is 
almost constant (c) over a long period that has seen substantial changes. 
He concludes that a relation may exist between the variability of the 
stock of money and the variability of income. This relation would 
probably have been a perfect correlation provided that there were no 
distorting factors (~Ds) with respect o the system (S) under consider- 
ation. Formally we may represent the argument as follows; 
O(t,/Ql, = at )  for ', t = 1867, . . . ,  1960 
O(t, Y, = fit) for t = 1867, . . . ,  1960 
O(t ,  Ott_ i ~ C, f it) fo r  t = 1867 . . . . .  1960 
(i) ©Vt: [((t, 1VI, = a,) ^  O(t, -qDs)) ~ (t, Y, = fi,)] (and also) 
(ii) ©Vt: [((t, Y, = fi,) ^  O(t, ~D ~)) ~ (t, 191, = at)] 
This scheme resembles the structure of P's explanation with respect o 
the electric circuit example; see scheme IV in Section 4. Remark that 
the 'assume' operator ~X does precisely what Friedman would have 
had in mind: we do not know X, but as we have no contradictory 
evidence (partly because of a lack of sufficient detailed knowledge) we 
may assume X to be the case. 
In the first part of the argument Friedman does not make a choice 
between the two possible conclusions (i) and (ii). Eventually, however, 
he has to make a choice because of the intuitive idea that causality runs 
only in one direction. It is interesting to notice that a condition as "the 
cause comes first" (see e.g., Nagel 1961, p. 74) is not conclusive in this 
context, because (as Figure 3 shows) one cannot be sure which one of 
two cycles comes first: apparent leads may "really" be lagged responses. 
These difficulties are further complicated, because anticipations play a 
crucial role in economics. The argument of the second part allows for 
another use of NMEL. Here, Friedman knows by definition ("arith- 
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metically") that changes in the money stock can be attributed to three 
proximate determinants. For each of the major changes in history he 
shows that one of these (autonomous) factors is present. Thereby, he 
frankly admits that "historically there have been many different rea- 
sons" (p. 221). Especially for the minor changes in the stock of money 
he explicitly adheres to an incompletely specified ceteris paribus clause 
(see Section 3). If we use AHF for "autonomous historical factors" the 
argument can be represented in the following formal way. 
OVt: [((t, AHF) ^ Q(t, -~Ds3)) ~ (t, Mt = o~t)] 
Fq(t', AHF) 
I~(t', Mt = 'xt) 
(t' denotes a constant, i.e., a specific timepoint, and t denotes a vari- 
able.) This scheme is similar to scheme III in Section 4. Also this 
argument is not valid in a standard logical account of explanation, 
because in such an account all potentially distorting factors have to be 
mentioned explicitly and, hence, have to be known. On the basis of 
the above argument Friedman poses that the direction of causality runs 
from money to income. So, he narrows down the set of admissible 
conclusions in the first part of the argument. In other words: the second 
part serves as background knowledge which eliminates conclusion (ii) 
of the first part. 
The third part of 'Money and Business Cycles' does not comprise a
genuine argument. In an informal discussion it is demonstrated that the 
covariance between money and income is in consonance with (can be 
derived from) the accepted body of economic theory. For this purpose 
Friedman introduces again an unspecified ceteris paribus clause (see 
Section 3). The third part of the argument is thus a means to demon- 
strate that the proposed irection of causality is consistent with the 
economic theory contained in the background knowledge. Of course, 
Friedman does not show that economic theory excludes the possibility 
that causality runs from income to money (cf. Section 4). 
The crucial role of the background knowledge is nicely illustrated by 
the debate between Friedman and one of his critics Tobin. In Tobin 
(1971) Friedman is criticized for making the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy; i.e., concluding that the event B is caused by event A, simply 
because B is preceded by A. Friedman anticipates this criticism in his 
paper 'Money and Business Cycles'. Suppose, he says, that we have a 
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similar body of evidence about the relation between the production of 
dressmakers' pins and income as we have about the relation between 
money and income, i.e., an increase in pin production is usually fol- 
lowed by an increase in income. This evidence, Friedman remarks, 
"would persuade neither us nor our readers to adopt a pin theory of 
business cycles" (p. 214), i.e., that an increase in income would be 
caused by an increase in pin production. The question is why we decide 
in favour of a monetary theory of business cycles? This choice is motiv- 
ated by Friedman by referring to supplementary evidence. This supple- 
mentary evidence is what we have called background knowledge and is 
provided in the second and third part of 'Money and Business Cycles'. t5 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have shown that explanations based on incomplete 
information do not always comply with Hempel's covering law model. 
In the example of the 'hidden' circuit we have seen that the relevant 
specific law (W) was not known beforehand, hence prediction was 
impossible. Still, person P could explain with hindsight why the lamp 
went on. Somehow person P was capable of inferring a law (W'), which 
is an approximation of W, from the observations that the switch S~ and 
the lamp went on at the same time. To account for this type of reasoning 
we introduced scheme II as a supplement to Hempel's covering law 
model. And we discussed a logic (NMEL) which validates arguments 
like scheme II. Furthermore it was shown that our NMEL analysis does 
not only apply to very simple explanations, but it is applicable to 
Friedman's ophisticated explanation of the monetary history of the 
U.S. as well. This is an interesting test case, because it has been very 
much disputed. Friedman's analysis is neither a simple case of a cover- 
ing law explanation, as we pointed out, nor is it a straightforward 
application of his own 'as-if' methodology. NMEL gives a fresh look 
on Friedman's actual ine of reasoning in 'Money and Business Cycles'. 
Different aspects of his (and Tobin's) arguments can all be formalized 
within NMEL. So, if our claims are correct, then the NMEL-analysis 
gives a more adequate account of causal explanations with incomplete 
knowledge than Hempel's covering law model. 
Needless to say that our analysis of explanation is of a tentative 
character. We are still somewhat surprised ourselves that our analysis 
of explanation yields results that differ so much from Hempel's analysis. 
FR IEDMAN'S  NON-MONOTONIC  REASONING 275 
If our critical comments are correct in this respect, how does it come 
that Hempel's covering law model has survived so many decades? A
possible answer to this question could be that philosophy of science 
itself is dominated by (logical) paradigms. As long as classical logic was 
the only logic available, people tend to lay every methodological issue 
on the procrustean bed of classical logic. Now that we have alternative 
logics at our diposal we can have a fresh look at these matters. Hence, 
non-monotonic logic might provide a new paradigm for the logical 
analysis of science. But of course putting a Kuhnean label on the 
NMEL-analysis doesn't justify it. In order to give a firmer base to our 
NMEL-analysis, we have to study to what extent it can be generalized. 
With this goal in mind there are at least two issues that have to be 
further investigated in subsequent research. First, we plan to write an 
article about the relation between Friedman's 'as-if' methodology and 
non-monotonic logic. In the introduction it was said that debates about 
the question to what extent Friedman did apply his 'as-if' methodology 
to his own research ave obscured the analysis of his actual research. 
However, we didn't deny that aspects of the 'as-if' methodology can 
be pointed out in his research. Although we didn't say much in this 
paper about the debate on Friedman's 'as-if' methodology, we have 
strong indications that what is called diagnostic reasoning in artificial 
intelligence can shed new light on this debate. As non-monotonic logic 
is an essential ingredient of diagnostic reasoning, it is to be expected 
that NMEL could be very useful for a better understanding of the 'as- 
if' methodology as well.~6 Second, in the philosophy of science there 
is a long-standing tradition of critical comments on Hempel's covering 
law model. It is interesting to study to what extent our NMEL analysis 
can deal with the comments made by other authors. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix we will give the syntax and semantics of NMEL. 
NMEL is a point-based temporal logic augmented by the modal oper- 
ators [] and O. NMEL is a simplified version of Shoham's non-mono- 
tonic epistemic logic CI as it is defined in Shoham (1988a, b). NMEL 
is simpler than CI, because NMEL is point-based, whereas Shoham's 
logic is internal-based. This simplification is not essential. 
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Syntax of NMEL 
Given P: a set of primitive propositions, TV: a set of temporal variables, 
e.g., t, TC: the set of temporal constants { . . . .  -2 , -1 ,  0, 1, 2 . . . .  } 
U {t'}, U :TCUTV,  and ~ a binary relation symbol, the set of 
well-formed formulas (wffs) of NMEL is defined inductively as follows: 
(1) If u~ ~ U and u2 ~ U, then ul = u2 and u~ ~< u2 are wffs. 
(2) If u E U andp ~ P, then (u,p) is a wff. 
(3) If ¢~ and ~P2 are wffs, then so are ~p~ A ~2, -7¢~, ff]¢~. 
(4) If q~ is a wff and t ~ TV, then Vtq~ is also a wff. 
We assume the usual definitions of v , ~--~, q, and so on. O~ is defined 
by ~q~,~-~ ~D -q q~. With respect o negation we have (u,~¢) ~ ~(u, q~). 
In expressions like (1, S~ = on), (1, M, = a,) and (t, AHF),  the subex- 
pressions $1 = on, Mt = at and AHF are considered to be primitive 
propositions, to keep NMEL as simple as possible. The generalization 
to a full predicate logical version of NMEL, i.e., not just quantification 
over temporal variables but also over object variables, is straightfor- 
ward. 
Semantics of NMEL 
We start with the following definitions. ~ is used to denote the natural 
numbers with the standard ordering />. A model M is a pair (W, I) 
where W is a nonempty universe of possible worlds, and I is an interpre- 
tation function I: P~ 2wxw. 17 No accessibility relation (R) between 
worlds is mentioned, because this relation is supposed to be universal, 
i.e., Vw, w' ~ W: wRw'. For an example of such a model, see Section 
4. A variable assignment is a function VA: TV ~ ~. If u ~ U then we 
define VAL(u) to be VA(u) if u ~ TV, and the standard interpretation 
of u if u ETC.  A formula q~ is true in (or technically speaking satisfied 
by) a world w of a model M under the variable assignment VA, written 
M, w ~ [VA], under the following conditions: 
M,w ~ Ul = uz[VA] iff VAL(ul) = VAL(u2) 
M ,w ~ ul ~ u2[VA] iff VAL(ul) <~ VAL(u2) 
M, w ~ (u, p)[VA] iff (w, VAL(u)) E I(p) 
M, w ~ q~l A q~2[VA] iff M, w e ¢I[VA] and M, w ~ [VA] 
M, w ~ -7 ~0[VA] iff M, w t~ ~o[va] 
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M, w ~ Vttp[VA] iff M, w ~ ~VA']  for all alternative assign- 
ments VA' that agree with VA everywhere except possibly 
on t. 
M, w ~ D~0[VA] iff M, w' ~ [VA] for all w' E W 
M, w ~ ©¢[VA] iff M, w' ~ ¢[VA] for at least one w' E W 
(Therefore we will be able to write M~ EJ~0[VA] and 
M g D¢[VA] without fear of ambiguity, and analogous for 
The reader familiar with modal ogic will note that from the identity 
of time across worlds follows the validity of the "Barcan formula", i.e., 
[3Vtq~ (---) Vt[3~. 
With respect to the syntax and semantics defined above we can define 
two entailment relations; a monotonic and a non-monotonic one. The 
monotonic entailment relation yields the monotonic version of NMEL. 
This logic is called TK in Shoham (1988a, b). The non-monotonic 
entailment relation yields NMEL itself. This logic is called CI in Sho- 
ham (1988a, b). 
DEFINITION 1. Monotonic entailment; ~ monotonically entails ¢, 
written ~ ~ ¢, if for all models M and all worlds w in M: 
If M, w ~ ~[VA] then M, w ~ ~[VA]. 
In other words, if E is true in a world w of a model M, then ¢ is true 
in this world w. 
DEFINITION 2. A wff ~ is valid if for all models M and all worlds 
w in M and all assignments VA: 
M, w ~ q~[VA]. 
DEFINITION 3. Non-monotonic entailment; F, non-monotonically en- 
tails ~, written E Pc ~0, if for all minimal models M of E and all worlds 
w in M: 
If M, w Pc ~[VA] then M, w ~ ~p[VA]. 
In other words, if X is true in a world w of a minimal model M of X, 
then ¢ is true in this world w. In order to define the notion of minimality 
we first have to give some preliminary definitions. 
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DEFINITION 4. A wff is base if it does not contain any occurrence 
of the modal operators [] or ~.  
DEFINITION 5. The latest timepoint (ltp) of a base formula is the 
latest timepoint mentioned in it, 
(1) The ltp of (t, p) is t. 
(2) The ltp of ~1 A ~ is the latest between the ltp of ~1 and the 
ltp of ~02. 
(3) The ltp of -7~0 is the ltp of ~. 
(4) The ltp of Vt~ is the earliest among the ltp's of all ~' which 
result from substituting in ~ a time point for all free occur- 
rences of t, or 0 if there is none. 
DEFINITION 6. A model M2 is more ignorant than a model MI, 
written M1 C M2, if there exists a time point t such that 
(1) for any base sentence ~ whose ltp ~< t, if M2 ~ [3~ then also 
M1 ~ t-7~, and 
(2) there exists some base sentence q~ whose ltp is t such that 
M~ ~ rT~, but M2 ~ []~. 
If M2 is more ignorant than M~, then M2 satisfies less formulas of the 
form []~ (with ~ a base wff) than M1. TM 
DEFINITION 7. M is said to be a minimal knowledge model of ~, 
written M Pc ~, if M ~ ~ and there is no other M' such that M' ~ ~ and 
MCM' .  
We will now present some results that are relevant for the arguments 
in the paper. Subsequently we will present the proofs of some of the 
arguments in the paper. 
As NMEL-models have an accessibility relation R that is universal, 
all the $5 valid formulas are valid in NMEL.19 Let a,/3 and y be well- 
formed formulas, then the following S5-theorems hold in NMEL: 
THEOREM 1. M ~ ~V/[(t, c~) ~ (t, y)] ~ M ~ Vt[((t, a)  A (t, /3)) 
(t, 3')]. 
Proof. Trivial, use the $5 valid formulas {p---~(t~--,~) and 
, - ,  A 
THEOREM 2. M ~ EqVt[((t, a ) A (t, /3)) ~ (t, y)] ~ M ~ Vt[(([-]t, 
~)  A I--I(t, /3))----~ [](t ,  V)]. 
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Proof. Trivial, use the Barcan formula DVt~*-~VtV]~ and the $5 
valid formulas [~(q~ --* O) ~ ([~q~ --* D~b) and IT(q~ ^  O) ~ ( I~  ^ V]~). 
THEOREM 3. The (unique) set of base sentences that are known in 
any minimal knowledge model of a causal theory is .exactly the set of 
all those formulas that are S5-entailed by all (positive and negative) 
atomic base sentences that are known in that minimal knowledge 
model. 
Proof. See Corollary 4.5 in Shoham (1988b). 2° 
As Shoham's definition of the notion causal is rather complicated, we 
will omit it here. In the following proofs of the arguments Theorem 3 
will only be applied if the premises of the argument constitute a causal 
theory. For example the premises in argument (VI) do not constitute 
a causal theory, because the third premise is not causal. However, the 
conclusion of this argument can be proved without Theorem 3. 
Proof of argument (IV). 
(1) [](2, Sl = on) 
(2) [](2, L = on) 
©Vt[((t, S~ = on) ^  O(t,--nD)) ~ (t, L = on)] (C0 
Consider an arbitrary minimal model M which makes the premises 1 
and 2 true. Due to the minimality of M it is obvious that 1 and 2 are 
the only atomic base formulas known in M. Furthermore, it is also 
obvious that the formula [] -7 Vt[(t, Sl = on) ~ (t, L = on)] is not S5- 
entailed by the premises 1 and 2. Hence, due to the minimality of M 
and Theorem 3 it follows that 
M ~ 7 [] -TVt[(t, $1 = on) ~ (t, L = on)] 
¢~ M ~ OVt[(t, S 1 ~--- on) ~ (t, L = on)]. 
Hence, by Theorem 1, 
M ~ ~Vt[((t, S 1 "~- on)  A ~(t, -TD)) ~ (t, L = on)]. 
Argument (IV) is not valid in a monotonic epistemic logic, i.e., Sho- 
ham's logic TK. This can be shown by the following counter example. 
Consider a model M' that satisfies the formulas 17(2, S~ = on), D(2, L = 
on), [](3, S~ = on) and D(3, L = off). However, as M' is not minimal 
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with respect o the knowledge at tz, it is not a minimal model of the 
premises 1 and 2. 
Proof of argument (V). 
(1) [3(2, $1 = on) 
[3(2, L = on) 
Consider an arbitrary minimal model M of premise 1. Note that premise 
1 is the only atomic base formula known in M. It is sufficient o observe 
that the formula [3(2, L = on) is not S5-entailed by this premise. Hence, 
due to the minimality of M and Theorem 3, it follows that 
M ~ 7 [3(2, L = on). 
Argument (V) is not valid in a monotonic epistemic logic, as the foll- 
owing counter example shows. Note that the following set of sentences 
is $5 consistent: {D(2, $1 = on), [3(2, L = on)}. Hence, it has a model, 
say M'. M' is a counter example for the argument. However, as M' is 
not minimal with respect o the premise 1, it is not a minimal model 
of this premise. 
Proof of argument (VI). 
(1) E](2, $1 = on) 
(2) I-3(2, Sz = on) 
(3) [3Vt[((t, $1 = on) ^  (t, $2 = on)) --* (t, L = on)] 
0(2,  L = on) 
Consider an arbitrary minimal model M of the premises 1, 2 and 
3. Due to Theorem 2, premise 3 implies Vt[(D(t,S1 = on) ^  C](t, $2 = 
on)) ---> El(t, L = on)]. Consequently, the instantiation [(El(2, $1 = 
on) ^  0(2,  $2 = on)) ~ (2, L = on)] is also true in M. And, together 
with the premises 1 and 2, this implies that M ~ [3(2, L = on). 
(Note that the minimality of M is not used in the proof. Conse- 
quently, the proof also holds for monotonic epistemic logic, i.e., the 
logic TK.) 
FR IEDMAN'S  NON-MONOTONIC REASONING 
Proof of argument (IV'). 
(1) 1--1(2, S, = on) 
(2) [](2, L = on) 
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OVt[((t, L = on) A ~(t, ~D) )~ (t, S, = on)] (C2) 
Analogous to the proof of (IV), observe that []-nVt[(t,L= 
on) ~ (t, S~ = on)] is not S5-entailed by the premises 1 and 2. 
Proof of argument (VII). 
(1) [](2, $1 = on) 
(2) [2](2, L = on) 
(3) T 
C~ ^  -7C2 
Consider an arbitrary minimal model M that satisfies the premises 1, 2 
and T. It was presupposed that ~C2 is S5-entailed by 1, 2 and T, i.e., 
1, 2, T ~--nC2. Furthermore it is presupposed that 1, 2 and T do not 
exclude C1, i.e., 1, 2, T ~ Ct. Hence, --nC1 is not Ss-entailed by 1, 2 and 
T. If we can prove that M ~ C1 and M ~ ~C2, then it follows immediately 
that M~C~^7C2.  M~C2 holds, because M~IA2^T and 
1, 2, T ~ ~C2. The proof of M ~ CI is more complicated. First observe 
that 1, 2, T g -nCI means that 1, 2, T I~ [] -7 Vt[((t, $1 = on) A 
Ot, (t,-'nD))~ (t, L = on)]. Hence, there is a model N such that 
N ~ 1 A 2 A T and N tt [] -1 Vt[((t, $1 = on) ^  ©(t, --nD)) 
( t , L= on)]. It is simple to see that then also N g []-qVt[(t,S~ = 
on)---~ (t, L = on)]. Consequently we also have 1, 2, T I~ •~Vt[(t, Sl = 
on) ~ (t, L = on)]. As this last formula is of the form ~,  with q~ a 
base formula, we can apply Theorem 3 with the result that 
M ~ ~ [] -1 Vt[(t, $1 = on) ~ (t, L = on) ] .  21 This implies, due to Theo- 
rem 1 and the definition of O, that M VOt[((t, Sx =on)A  
O(t, ~D))  --~ (t, L = on)]. Hence, we have M ~ C1. 
NOTES 
* We gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions and critical comments of Johan van 
Benthem, Bert Hamminga, Kevin Hoover, Theo Kuipers, and Rick Looyen. 
1 See for example Hirsch.and e Marchi (1986) and also Hammond (1988). 
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2 See Hempel (1965). 
3 For our view on the important role of the unspecified ceteris paribus clause we are very 
much indebted to Kuipers (1986). Furthermore, Kuipers was the one who suggested that 
we should use electric ircuits to illustrate the role of incomplete knowledge in causal 
explanations. For a comparison between his ideas and ours, see Tan (1988). 
4 As Friedman is usually regarded as the main author of this work, we will in the sequel 
simply refer to Friedman. 
5 Naturally, there is a difference in degree, because lectricity laws are better established 
than economic theoretical laws. 
6 For a survey of non-monotonic logic see Ginsberg (1987). 
7 Those readers familiar with Hintikka's epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962) will observe that 
is not the same as Hintikka's belief operator. From a technical point of view © behaves 
as a possibility operator in modal logic. This has the effect that a formula of the form 
©¢ ^  ©-~ ¢ is not inconsistent in NMEL. 
s The fact that no formula of the form I~q~, which is not a classical $5 deductive conse- 
quence of A, is satisfied by a minimal model M of A, is justified by Theorem 3 in the 
appendix. B is a classical $5 deductive consequence of A, if B is derivable from A in 
classical $5 modal logic, i.e., the logic TK in Shoham (1988a, b). For further details 
about TK see the appendix. 
9 See Hughes and Cresswell (1972). 
10 It is presupposed that B is not logically equivalent with [] --1 C. 
11 The proof of (IV) indicates that Cl is not the strongest conclusion entailed by the 
premises 1and 2, the strongest conclusion is ©Vt[(t, Si = on) --* (t, L = on)]. However in 
(IV) we mention C1 instead of this stronger conclusion to emphasize the analogy with 
(III). 
12 By a monotonic epistemic logic we mean a monotonic version of NMEL; i.e., a logic 
that is identical to NMEL except hat the minimal entailment operator Pc is replaced by 
a classical entailment operator ~. See the logic TK in the appendix. 
~3 This line of arguments shows that it is easier to explain than to predict. In predictions 
we have to know the relevant covering laws, whereas in explanations we can do without 
them. 
~4 Another objection could be that two opposite (although not contradictory!) con- 
clusions, such as C1 and C2, both follow in NMEL from the very same premises. 
However, a closer look reveals that this happens in classical ogic too. For example in 
classical propositional logic both p --~ q and q --* p follow from the set of premises {p, q}. 
15 Tobin (1971) is also interesting for another reason. He shows that the data mentioned 
by Friedman can also be accounted for by a theory that proposes exactly the opposite 
causal direction, i.e., an increase of money is caused by an increase in income. In order 
to make his case Tobin criticizes Friedman's claim that the factors determining the 
increase of money are autonomous (AHF). Tobin provides an alternative mechanism 
which explains changes in money in terms of changes in income. Hence, the debate 
between Tobin and Friedman is ~ssentially about the correctness of Friedman's back- 
ground knowledge. 
16 For a detailed analysis of non-monotonic aspects in diagnostic reasoning see for 
example Reiter (1987). An interesting alternative approach to diagnostic reasoning is 
proposed in Jackson (1988). 
~7 In Shoham (1988a, b) the range of the interpretation function I is 2 T M  instead of 
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2 w×~. The reason is that NMEL is point based, whereas Shoham's logic CI is interval- 
based. This simplification is not essential. 
18 Note that ' C ' is not interpreted as set-inclusion. 
19 For further details about $5 modal ogic see Hughes and Cresswell (1972). 
20 Corollary 4.5 says: "The (unique) set of base sentences that are known in any c.m.i. 
model of a causal theory is exactly the set of tautological consequences of all (positive 
and negative) atomic base sentences that are known in that c.m.i, model." C.m.i. models 
are what we call minimal knowledge models. The notion 'tautological consequence' is 
not explicitly defined by Shoham. However, from the definition of the semantics and 
Definition 1 it follows immediately that tautological consequence is equivalent to S~- 
entailed. 
2~ For the sake of the argument we will assume that T is a causal theory. 
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